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The Limits of Privacy:
Some Reflections on
Section 8 of the Charter
Croft Michaelson*

I. INTRODUCTION
On the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,1 we would do well to remember how very
different our legal world was only a quarter-century ago. Police officers,
acting under writs of assistance, were able at any time of night and day
to enter homes to search for narcotics if they believed narcotics were on
the premises, and could search any person found therein. If they suspected
public washrooms might be used for “indecent” acts, police officers
would not uncommonly hide themselves behind air ducts and the like, in
order to surreptitiously observe individuals in washroom stalls, a distasteful
form of surveillance that degraded both the watched and the watchers.
And Fontana, in the first edition of his text, The Law of Search Warrants
in Canada, recounted that defence counsel seldom fully explored the
use of a search warrant by police officers,2 which no doubt was the case
because relevant evidence was always admissible even if illegally
obtained.3 It was a world unrecognizable to those who practise today.
I was one of those fortunate enough to enter law school shortly after
the Charter came into effect, and I well remember both the enthusiasm
with which we debated the ramifications of this new constitutional
recognition of legal rights, and our sense of uncertainty as to where the
*

Senior General Counsel, Public Prosecution Service of Canada. The views expressed in
this paper are, of course, my own and not those of the Public Prosecution Service.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
James A. Fontana, The Law of Search Warrants in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974),
at vii.
3
R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.), unless the evidence was
“gravely prejudicial to the accused”, of “tenuous” admissibility, and of “trifling” probative force,
in which case the trial judge might have a discretion to exclude it: per Martland J., at 17.

88

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Charter would take us. The early days did not, however, seem promising.
I remember that one of my classmates tried to raise the implications of
the Charter in evidence class on one occasion, and our law professor
refused to discuss it, telling us that he did not think that the Charter
would really have much impact. Our experiences in the student legal aid
clinic seemed to confirm what our law professor was telling us. Although
we were eager to embrace the Charter and sought to raise it in the
summary trial courts whenever we could, trial judges seemed reluctant
to find violations of the Charter and, even when they did, seemed even
more reluctant to exclude the evidence. We found ourselves wondering
at times whether the Charter was just another largely toothless Bill of
Rights4 dressed up in different guise.
But any fears that the Charter would be given a narrow and constrained
interpretation were soon put to rest. In Hunter v. Southam,5 Dickson J.
(as he then was) held that the Charter was a purposive document intended
to restrain government interference with individual rights and freedoms,
and as such had to be given a broad and generous interpretation.6 With
this sweeping statement, it was clear that we were living in revolutionary
times, and the door was opened to a re-examination of all of the old
rules and approaches. We were, indeed, in new and uncharted territory.
The 25th anniversary of the Charter provides a fitting opportunity to
re-examine the jurisprudence that has followed in the years after Hunter
v. Southam.7 In the discussion that follows, I will explore the framework
which has been developed by the Supreme Court to determine whether
an accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether there
has been an unreasonable interference with that privacy interest. I will
argue that the Court’s current approach to the first question ― whether the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy ― is largely adequate to
the task, but that it is crucial, in addressing novel claims to privacy, that
we maintain our focus on the underlying values that privacy protections
seek to promote. With respect to the second question ― whether there
has been an unreasonable interference with the privacy interest ― I will
suggest that the Supreme Court has recently introduced some confusion
and uncertainty into the law concerning administrative and regulatory
searches. And, finally, I will argue that where the accused successfully
4

Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”].
6
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97, at 105-06 (S.C.C.).
7
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
5
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establishes a section 8 violation, the question whether or not to exclude
the evidence should be decided by weighing the societal interests in
truth-finding and suppression of crime against the particular privacy
interest invaded, and will suggest that such a weighing process should
ordinarily favour the admission of the evidence, save for instances where
the police deliberately violated the offender’s rights under section 8.
Any discussion on section 8, however, has to start at the beginning and
the seminal case of Hunter v. Southam.

II. HUNTER V. SOUTHAM
Hunter v. Southam8 involved a challenge to a legislative provision
under the Combines Investigation Act9 which authorized the Director of
Investigations and Research of the Combines Investigation Branch to
enter premises in order to search for and seize any documents that were
relevant to an inquiry under the Act. The only real limitation on the
entry was that it could only be made pursuant to a certificate granted by
a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (“RTPC”),
who had to be satisfied that the Director reasonably believed that relevant
documents might be found on the premises.
A number of important principles were laid down by Dickson J.
First, he held that section 8 is aimed at protecting the individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than places themselves. He
then went on to hold that, although the state interest in law enforcement
can override the individual’s right to privacy, state intrusion can only
occur if there is prior judicial authorization, given that the Charter gives
preference to the individual’s right to privacy. In other words, before
any intrusion can occur, the competing interests of the state and individual
have to be balanced by a judicial officer, an individual who must be able
to decide the issue in a neutral and impartial manner. Moreover, the
standard for judicial authorization, at least where the state’s interest is
law enforcement, is a credibly based probability that evidence will be
found as a consequence of the intrusion. Searches conducted without
prior judicial authorization, warrantless searches, were held prima facie
unreasonable, with the state bearing the onus of demonstrating why the
search was reasonable in the circumstances. Finally, any search or

8
9

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
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seizure, to be found reasonable, must be authorized by a law which itself
is reasonable, and executed in a reasonable manner.
The legislative provision at issue in Hunter v. Southam10 was found
to violate section 8 as it was not a reasonable law. There were two
fundamental flaws in the legislation. First, certificates granted by a
member of the RTPC did not amount to prior judicial authorization
because it could not be said that they were granted by a neutral and
impartial arbiter. Second, the issuance of a certificate under the Act was
not based on reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be
found, and therefore failed to meet the minimum constitutional standard
for prior judicial authorization.
After Hunter v. Southam,11 it was clear that any search carried out
by agents of the state had to have its basis in some grant of legal
authority, either through some express legislative provision,12 or under a
common law rule.13 If there was no lawful authority for a search, the
search would be illegal and hence unreasonable. It was also clear that
investigators had to obtain a warrant in order to conduct a search to
advance the state’s interest in “law enforcement”, provided that it was
feasible to do so. What was left unexplored was what a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” encompassed, and although the Court alluded to
the possibility that some standard other than that set out in Hunter v.
Southam might suffice to justify a state intrusion where the interests
were something other than law enforcement, it was left to another day to
determine what those interests might be. In the years following, the courts
wrestled with these issues and it is to those issues that I now turn.

III. WHAT IS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY?
Privacy, as many commentators have noted, is a rather elusive and
malleable concept. What is relatively certain is that privacy is considered
very important in free and democratic societies; indeed, the right to keep
some aspects of our lives private is recognized as a fundamental human
10

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
12
See, e.g., R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 173 (S.C.C.) ― warrantless
search of drugs authorized under s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1 [rep. S.C. 1996,
c. 19, s. 94].
13
See, for example, R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) ―
warrantless entry and search authorized under the common law Waterfield rule (R. v. Waterfield,
[1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.).
11
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right in international human rights instruments.14 Defining the scope of
that right, however, is more problematic. While we all can agree that
individuals should be entitled to maintain some private sphere from
which they can exclude others, we must also readily acknowledge that no
one lives a hermetically sealed existence, free from interaction with others
and a public sphere of activity. Conduct which is private in one context,
may well be public in another. The right to privacy, like other rights, can
be relinquished or abandoned by the privacy claimant, in which case the
question may well become whether the relinquishment was absolute, or
limited in its effect to a particular purpose or audience. Determining
where the public sphere ends and the private begins can be exceedingly
difficult. As Binnie J. observed in the recent decision of R. v. Tessling,15
“[p]rivacy is a protean concept.”16
Even a cursory review of the vast body of literature on privacy and
its theoretical underpinnings is well beyond the scope of this paper;17
however, most conceptions of privacy appear to agree that privacy has
two fundamental characteristics. First, by definition, a right to privacy
confers on the individual the ability to exclude others from the “private”
realm, whatever that realm may be. Second, in free and democratic
societies, privacy is closely tied to the value our society places on the
individual. We recognize that certain aspects of life are profoundly intimate
and justify the grant of a right of privacy. Moreover, we recognize that
each one of us should be permitted the right to control access to certain
aspects of our lives, because the ability to exclude others is necessary to
promote our sense of self and actualize our lives as distinct individuals.
In a sense, we confer a right of privacy on individuals simply because it
conforms with our society’s ideal of what it means to be an individual.
As La Forest J. put it in R. v. Dyment:18

14
See, for example, Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 9-14, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368,
which states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
15
[2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.).
16
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 25 (S.C.C.).
17
See Richard B. Bruyer, “Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature” (2006)
43 Alta. L. Rev. 553 for such a review. Bruyer argues that all of the conceptions of privacy set out
in the literature are grounded on notions of individual liberty, which he rejects in favour of a
conception of privacy based on the entitlement of persons to equal treatment in respect of dignity
and autonomy.
18
[1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 (S.C.C.).
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Grounded in man’s physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential
for the well-being of the individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy
of constitutional protection …19

We should, therefore, not find it surprising that the Supreme Court
concluded that the purpose of privacy is to promote the dignity, integrity
and autonomy of the individual.20
We then have to ask, though, what aspects of life promote the dignity,
integrity and autonomy of individuals, and therefore fall within the
“private” sphere. Rather than attempt to list all of the activities that are,
or may be, private, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized early on in
the section 8 jurisprudence that there are three distinct zones or realms
of privacy: privacy as it relates to the person (the body); territorial or
spatial privacy; and informational privacy.21
The basis for the first of these, privacy of the body, is readily
understood, tied in as it is to societal notions of decency and bodily
integrity. In our society, we place great weight on the right of individuals
to make decisions as to who will be permitted to have access to their bodies
and in what manner. Our bodies are who we are, and non-consensual
invasions of our person will inevitably offend our sense of autonomy
and diminish our dignity. For this reason, claims to privacy of the person
have been said to have the greatest claim for protection.22
The rationale for the second zone of privacy is also easy to understand.
We need to have private spaces within which we can pursue private
acts. If individuals are to have a private realm from which they can
19

R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 254 (S.C.C.).
See R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203, at 212 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.:
“… such investigative practices as videotaping of events in a private hotel room (R. v. Wong
(1990), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 1 C.R. (4th) 1), and seizure by state agents of a
blood sample taken by medical personnel for medical purposes (R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82,
45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 (S.C.C.)), have been found to run afoul of the s. 8 right against unreasonable
search and seizure in that the dignity, integrity and autonomy of the individual are directly
compromised” (emphasis added). See also R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244,
at 255 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J. where he states that privacy “is based on the notion of the dignity
and integrity of the individual”.
21
See R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 255 (S.C.C.):
The first challenge, then, is to find some means of identifying those situations where we
should be most alert to privacy considerations. Those who have reflected on the matter have
spoken of zones or realms of privacy: see, for example, Privacy and Computers, the Report
of the Task Force established by the Department of Communications/Department of Justice
(1972), especially at pp. 12-14. The report classifies these claims to privacy as those involving
territorial or spatial aspects, those related to the person, and those that arise in the information
context.
22
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
20
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exclude others, one of the easiest ways to recognize that is by demarcating
the “private” from the “public” through reference to traditional property
rights. My property is “private”; hence, I can exclude others from it. In that
sense, property functions as a proxy for the individual’s right to privacy.23
The boundaries of these two zones of privacy are easy to discern ―
bodies are bodies and places are places. But even if places may be easy
to define on the facts of a particular case, it is still necessary to determine
whether the privacy claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the particular place. After all, section 8 protects people, not places. If a
person is lawfully in possession of a place, the answer seems clear that
he or she is likely to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect
of some aspect of that place.24 But since private property is only a proxy
for reasonable expectations of privacy, one has to exercise some care in
the analysis. The boundaries of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy
and the territorial limits of the property in question may not coincide.
Thus, I can assert a reasonable expectation of privacy within the confines of
my house, but not necessarily my driveway.25 And what if one’s connection
with the place in question is something less than lawful possession? Our
common experience tells us that not everyone who has some connection,
however tenuous, with a place can reasonably expect to find privacy
there. The owner of an apartment building cannot reasonably claim that
he has an expectation of privacy in an apartment which he has rented to
another person.26 The furnace repairman cannot be heard to say that he
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in my home simply because he
happens to be on my premises, or can he? And what about friends and
family, who are my guests at a dinner party ― do they have a reasonable
expectation of privacy? What if they reside with me for the weekend?
Can they then assert that an intrusion into my home trenches on their
right to privacy and interferes with their dignity, integrity and autonomy?
These are not easy questions to answer.
The boundaries of the third zone of privacy, informational privacy,
are even more difficult to delineate. Not all information about an individual
necessarily promotes dignity, integrity and autonomy. Some information
23

R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207, at para. 16 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405 (S.C.C.) ― driver of motor
vehicle has reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle; R. v. Lauda, [1999] O.J. No. 2180,
136 C.C.C. (3d) 358 (Ont. C.A.) ― lessor of farmland has reasonable expectation of privacy in
posted lands.
25
R. v. Lotozky, [2006] O.J. No. 2516, 210 C.C.C. (3d) 509 (Ont. C.A.).
26
R. v. Pugliese, [1992] O.J. No. 450, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont. C.A.).
24
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pertaining to the individual may be so mundane or innocuous that its
disclosure could not possibly affect the individual’s dignity, integrity or
autonomy. Furthermore, the disclosure of some information, such as
information pertaining to one’s taxable income, may well be required as
a matter of course for civil society to function properly. And finally,
some information about the individual, if kept hidden, may actually
serve to undermine those values which privacy seeks to promote. I am
thinking here of information concerning criminal acts that may have
been committed by the individual, which typically will have resulted in
the denigration of another person’s dignity, integrity and autonomy,
a point to which I will return to later.
The challenge then, whether we are speaking of territorial or
informational privacy, is to decide whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the circumstances. How are we to go about
determining this? The Supreme Court, in the early years, approached
this question by undertaking a normative analysis that was largely
disconnected from the actual facts of the case. That is, rather than
determining whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of
privacy having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, the Court
posed questions “framed in broad and neutral terms” 27 and asked
whether individuals in our society should generally enjoy an expectation
of privacy. The question was not whether the landlord had an expectation
of privacy in the tenant’s apartment, but whether individuals in society
should enjoy an expectation of privacy inside apartments. And the question
was not whether the furnace repairman had an expectation of privacy
inside my home, but rather whether individuals generally should enjoy
an expectation of privacy in homes.
This normative approach was first applied by the Supreme Court in
R. v. Duarte,28 a decision which surprised many of us at the time. The
facts of the case are not complex. Duarte met with an informer and
undercover police officer in an apartment which had been wired to
intercept and record their conversations, and discussed a cocaine
transaction. The informer and undercover police officer had both consented
to the interception of their communications. On these facts, many of us
thought that the outcome was obvious. Parliament had already sought to
protect private communications from being surreptitiously intercepted

27
28

R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 481 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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by making it a criminal offence to do so,29 but had expressly exempted
the interception of private communications from the reach of the criminal
sanction when one of the parties to the communication had consented to
the interception.30 Such a provision seemed reasonable and in accord
with common sense. How could Duarte claim an expectation of privacy
in his conversation with the informer and undercover police officer, when
they were free to disclose the content of his conversation to anyone
else?
The Crown’s argument found favour with the Ontario Court of
Appeal,31 but was rejected by the Supreme Court. The question for the
Supreme Court was not whether Duarte had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his communication with the undercover police officer, but
rather whether individuals generally in society would expect that their
private communications with others would not be intercepted by the
state without prior judicial authorization. As La Forest J. explained a
few months later in another case, R. v. Wong,32 which applied the same
type of generalized normative analysis:
. . . R. v. Duarte approached the problem of determining whether a
person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in given circumstances
by attempting to assess whether, by the standards of privacy that
persons can expect to enjoy in a free and democratic society, the
agents of the state were bound to conform to the requirements of the
Charter when effecting the intrusion in question. This involves asking
whether the persons whose privacy was intruded upon could legitimately
claim that in the circumstances it should not have been open to the
agents of the state to act as they did without prior judicial authorization.
To borrow from Professor Amsterdam’s reflections, supra, at p. 403,
the adoption of this standard invites the courts to assess whether
giving their sanction to the particular form of unauthorized surveillance
in question would see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free
and open society.

29
Then s. 178.11(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 provided: “Every one who,
by means of an electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, wilfully intercepts a private
communication is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for five years.”
30
Then s. 178.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 provided that s. 178.11(1)
did not apply to “a person who has the consent to intercept, express or implied, of the originator of
the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it”.
31
R. v. Sanelli, Duarte and Fasciano, [1987] O.J. No. 821, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
32
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.).
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When the intrusion takes the form of unauthorized and surreptitious
electronic audio surveillance, R. v. Duarte makes it clear that to sanction
such an intrusion would see our privacy diminished in just such an
unacceptable manner. While there are societies in which persons have
learned, to their cost, to expect that a microphone may be hidden in
every wall, it is the hallmark of a society such as ours that its members
hold to the belief that they are free to go about their daily business
without running the risk that their words will be recorded at the sole
discretion of agents of the state.
Accordingly, by the standards of privacy that prevail in a free and
open society such as our own, Duarte was entitled to claim that
judicially unauthorized participant surveillance did offend against his
reasonable expectations of privacy when he engaged in what he had
every reason to believe was an ordinary private conversation. To have
held otherwise would have been tantamount to exposing any member
of society whom the state might choose to target to the same risk of
having his or her nominally private conversation become the subject of
surreptitious recordings.33

R. v. Wong was another surprising case. The accused was alleged to
have operated an illegal gaming house in a hotel room, to which he had
invited members of the public by indiscriminately circulating notices at
public bars and restaurants. The police gathered evidence of the illegal
gambling enterprise through surreptitious video surveillance of the hotel
room. In determining whether Wong had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the question for the majority was not whether Wong had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in these particular circumstances.
Rather, according to La Forest J., “the question must be framed in broad
and neutral terms so as to become whether in a society such as ours
persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”34
There are several problems with the type of normative analysis
adopted by the Court in both Duarte35 and Wong.36 The first problem is
that the outcome of any particular inquiry into the existence of a reasonable
expectation of privacy is largely driven by how one has framed the
question, rather than the actual facts of the particular case. If we ask a
question that is very general, we tend to find ourselves talking about
33
34
35
36

R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 478 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 481 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 1 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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privacy generally and get an answer that is different than if we framed
the question with more specificity. The greater the level of generality to
the question posed, the more likely it is that one will find a reasonable
expectation of privacy. So, returning to my example of the repairman in
my home, we get one answer when we ask whether individuals behind
closed doors in homes should have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
and a different one when we ask whether a visiting repairman inside a
home should have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This starts to
look like results-driven reasoning.
A second problem flows from the first. If one adopts an approach
that is too general and disconnected from the facts of a particular case,
outcomes are no longer consonant with our common experience and
societal expectations. One ends up extending privacy protection to
situations that do not warrant it. For example, La Forest J. describes the
drug-related conversation in Duarte37 as an “ordinary private conversation”,
and yet I think most of us would regard the conversation as anything
but. The drug trade is rife with informers and undercover police officers
― could Duarte really reasonably expect that his conversation about the
cocaine transaction would remain private and free from interception by
the state?
A generalized approach to normative analysis also risks leading us
astray from the concern which should lie at the heart of every inquiry
into reasonable expectation of privacy: would the individual’s dignity,
integrity and autonomy be advanced or diminished in the instant case by
validating the privacy claim? The point I am trying to make here is best
illustrated by the case of R. v. Babinski.38 Babinski sexually assaulted
a woman, and later broke into her apartment. His victim went to the
police, and told them that Babinski had said that he would be calling
her. The police suggested recording the conversation in the hope that
they would obtain incriminating evidence of the break-in. The victim
consented to the recording of her conversation with Babinski. Under
Duarte,39 Babinski’s communication with his victim 40 was protected
under section 8 of the Charter and the consensual recording of the call in
the absence of prior judicial authorization was a violation of Babinski’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. Babinski’s conversation with his
37

R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).
[2005] O.J. No. 138, 193 C.C.C. (3d) 172 (Ont. C.A.).
39
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).
40
The victim was unavailable to testify at any trial of the break-in, since Babinski
murdered her shortly thereafter.
38
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victim became just another “ordinary private conversation”. And yet one
might ask how reasonable it is for the perpetrator of a crime to expect
that his confession to his victim will remain private? One might also ask
why Babinski’s statements to his victim, acknowledging the break-in,
should be subject to Charter protection. Babinski had violated his victim’s
dignity, integrity and autonomy by forcibly violating her reasonable
expectation of privacy. How can it be that his admission to this effect
promotes dignity, integrity and autonomy? The simple answer is that it
does not. The content of Babinski’s communications did not warrant
protection under section 8, nor did Duarte’s.
The final problem with a generalized normative approach to the
determination of reasonable expectation of privacy is that it fails to
provide police officers and prosecutors with sufficient guidance during
investigations. Police and prosecutors often confront wildly varying
factual scenarios and have to make decisions based on their common
experiences and their understanding of societal expectations. Those who
are expected to faithfully apply the terms of the Charter need at least
some semblance of certainty and predictability from the courts, yet a
broad and neutral normative analysis provides neither. One is left with
only vague uncertainty until the question is ultimately framed and decided
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court subsequently abandoned its
generalized approach to normative analysis, in favour of an approach
that examined all of the circumstances in deciding whether an individual
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In R. v. Edwards,41 the majority
of the Court decided that the existence of a reasonable expectation
of privacy would be determined on an assessment of the “totality of
circumstances”, which would include, for claims made to territorial or
spatial privacy, circumstances such as: the accused’s presence at the
time of the search, possession or control of the property or place searched,
ownership of the property or place, historical use of the property or
item, ability to regulate access, existence of a subjective expectation of
privacy and the objective reasonableness of the expectation. 42 The
question thereafter was no longer whether individuals in our society
generally enjoyed an expectation of privacy in apartments, but whether
an “especially privileged guest”, who had no authority to exclude others,
41

[1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at 150-51 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 107 (S.C.C.).
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the owner of the premises
granted the police access.43 The question was no longer whether people
in automobiles generally had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but
rather whether a passenger in a car had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a bag stuffed with stolen clothing, when she did not assert
any ownership interest in it.44
The Edwards45 totality of the circumstances test has provided a flexible
framework that has proven itself well suited to address the varied
circumstances police and prosecutors face. More importantly, the test
approaches the assessment of reasonable expectation of privacy in a
manner that avoids the problems with a normative analysis disconnected
from the actual facts of the case. Under the Edwards test, the outcome
of any given fact scenario is likely to be more closely aligned with our
common experience and societal expectations, and therefore, I would
suggest, more likely to lead to predictable outcomes that we consider just.
In the context of informational privacy, the Supreme Court, per
Sopinka J., adopted an approach somewhat similar to the Edwards46 test
in R. v. Plant,47 a case concerned with whether an individual held a
reasonable expectation of privacy in computer records of his electricity
consumption. In assessing whether the accused had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, Sopinka J. looked to a number of factors: the
nature of the information itself, the nature of the relationship between the
party releasing the information and the party claiming its confidentiality,
the place where the information was obtained and the manner in which
it was obtained. More importantly, Sopinka J. recognized that not all
information is entitled to protection under section 8. Taking a purposive
approach, he held that privacy protection is restricted to information which
is personal and confidential and serves to promote the individual’s dignity,
integrity and autonomy:
. . . in order for constitutional protection to be extended, the information
seized must be of a “personal and confidential” nature. In fostering the
underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that
s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal

43
44
45
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R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.).
[1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203 (S.C.C.).
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information which individuals in a free and democratic society would
wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state. 48

The Supreme Court in Tessling49 recently adapted the Edwards test
in order to address reasonable expectations of privacy in the context of
information privacy. Justice Binnie said that in approaching privacy
claims in relation to information (which in Tessling was an image of
heat emanating from the accused’s house), one first must ascertain the
nature of the information at stake, and determine whether the accused
had a direct interest in the information. One then asks whether the accused
had a subjective expectation of privacy in relation to the information,
and whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. The objective
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy is determined by examining
the following factors: the place where the alleged “search” occurred;
whether the information was in public view; whether the information
had been abandoned; whether the information was in the hands of third
parties and, if so, whether it was subject to an obligation of confidentiality;
whether the investigative technique was intrusive, or objectively
unreasonable; and whether the information exposed any of the intimate
details of the accused’s lifestyle, or was information of a biographical
nature.50
One can quibble with the relevance of some of these factors. For
example, one may well ask why the intrusiveness of the investigative
technique should matter when we are assessing the reasonableness of
the expectation of privacy. If one has an expectation of privacy in
information, the objective reasonableness of that expectation should not
ordinarily be dependent on whether the state has extracted the information
in an intrusive manner. I would think that this factor, and the extent to
which the investigative technique itself is objectively unreasonable
(whatever that means), are best left to the second stage of the section 8
analysis, the inquiry into whether the search itself is unreasonable. And
one may also ask why we even bother inquiring whether the accused has
a subjective expectation of privacy, since the outcome seems largely
dependent on whether the expectation of privacy was objectively
reasonable. As Binnie J. aptly observes, the subjective expectation of
privacy is of only limited import in any inquiry into reasonable expectation
of privacy:
48
49
50

R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203, at 213 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 32 (S.C.C.).
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The subjective expectation of privacy is important but its absence should
not be used too quickly to undermine the protection afforded by s. 8 to
the values of a free and democratic society. In an age of expanding means
for snooping readily available on the retail market, ordinary people
may come to fear (with or without justification) that their telephones
are wiretapped or their private correspondence is being read. One
recalls the evidence at the Watergate Inquiry of conspirator Gordon
Liddy who testified that he regularly cranked up the volume of his
portable radio to mask (or drown out) private conversations because he
feared being “bugged” by unknown forces. Whether or not he was
justified in doing so, we should not wish on ourselves such an
environment. Suggestions that a diminished subjective expectation of
privacy should automatically result in a lowering of constitutional
protection should therefore be opposed. It is one thing to say that a
person who puts out the garbage has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in it. It is quite another to say that someone who fears their
telephone is bugged no longer has a subjective expectation of privacy
and thereby forfeits the protection of s. 8. Expectation of privacy is a
normative rather than a descriptive standard.51

(emphasis in original omitted)
This is clearly correct. While we may be free to relinquish our right
to privacy, it is not extinguished simply because someone else has told
us that they are going to regularly invade our privacy. Privacy cannot be
lost as a result of a forcible taking by another.52 So, I would agree that
the absence of a subjective expectation of privacy, where it is the result
of an actual or feared forced deprivation of privacy, cannot be used as
the basis to deny someone a claim to protection under section 8. To this
I would add the obvious point that the presence of a subjective
expectation of privacy conversely does not automatically confer section
8 protection. At the end of the day, the question for determination on the
first stage of every section 8 claim is simply whether our societal values
are such that we are prepared to acknowledge that, in the circumstances
of the case, the accused had a valid and enforceable expectation of
privacy. In this sense, the section 8 inquiry still remains a normative
one, but it is one that is always informed by the specific facts of the
instant case.
51

R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 42 (S.C.C.).
See, for example, R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
52

102

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The result in Tessling53 turned on the fact that the information at
issue did not form part of the accused’s biographical core of personal
information or reveal any intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle. It
was, therefore, not entitled to constitutional protection under section 8:
External patterns of heat distribution on the external surfaces of a
house is not information in which the respondent had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The heat distribution, as stated, offers no
insight into his private life, and reveals nothing of his “biographical
core of personal information”. Its disclosure scarcely affects the
“dignity, integrity and autonomy” of the person whose house is subject
of the FLIR image (Plant, at p. 293).54

As Binnie J. acknowledges here, not all information promotes dignity,
integrity and autonomy. Indeed, some information, such as information
relating to criminal acts, undermines these values. The man who beats
his spouse, the purveyor of child pornography, the drug trafficker who
manufactures and distributes methamphetamine, none of these can
legitimately claim that information concerning their conduct should
remain private to promote their dignity, integrity and autonomy. In many
instances, however, they may be able to shelter such information behind
other proper privacy claims. Although the spouse beater may have no
legitimate privacy claim in relation to the fact that he beats his spouse,
he can nonetheless shelter himself behind his general right to privacy in
his home.
I would argue, though, that technologies which reveal information
pertaining to criminal acts, without also trenching upon legitimate privacy
claims, do not interfere with any reasonable expectation of privacy. For
example, technologies that reveal the existence of a marijuana grow
operation inside a home, without intruding into the individual’s
biographical core of personal information or the intimate details of
his or her life, do not give rise to viable section 8 claims. Thus, the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in the recent decision of R. v. Cheung,55
was correct to hold that use of a digital recording ammeter to monitor
electrical consumption in a home did not violate section 8, even though
the information derived therefrom was probative of the fact that a
marijuana grow operation was being conducted inside the house.
Similarly, I would argue that the use of dogs to sniff for information of a
53
54
55

R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 63 (S.C.C.).
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criminal nature ― drugs, explosives, and the like ― do not trench on
the values which section 8 seeks to promote.
In coming to grips with novel technologies which may permit the
police to gather information about some activities, it will always be
crucial to ask whether the information in question, if protected from
disclosure, serves to advance the values of dignity, integrity and autonomy.
If it does not, privacy protection should not be provided under section 8.
A purposive approach should always be central to the first stage of the
analysis.

IV. WHAT IS A REASONABLE SEARCH?
Once an accused demonstrates that he or she held a reasonable
expectation of privacy which was the subject of state intrusion, the
question then becomes whether that intrusion was reasonable. There are
several bases on which a search or seizure might be found unreasonable.
The particular intrusion in question might not be authorized by law,
because there is no specific statute or common law rule permitting the
search.56 The police may have overstepped the boundaries of the authority
conferred upon them.57 Or, the police may have used unreasonable force
in executing a search warrant.
As set out above, Hunter v. Southam58 established that, where the
state interest is law enforcement, a reasonable search requires prior
judicial authorization where feasible, and the standard which must be
met before a search or seizure can be permitted is one of credibly based
probability. Of course, implicit in the Hunter v. Southam standard was
that a warrantless search might be reasonable, if it was not possible to
obtain prior judicial authorization in the circumstances, or if the state
interest was something other than law enforcement.
Four years after Hunter v. Southam,59 the Court had to consider
whether the Hunter standards were applicable to searches of the person
at the border. Such searches were permissible under the Customs Act60
without prior judicial authorization, on a standard less than reasonable

56
57
58
59
60

R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at para. 12 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at para. 12 (S.C.C.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40.
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grounds to believe that the person was in possession of contraband.61
The Court held, per Dickson C.J.C., that individuals entering Canada
had a reduced expectation of privacy and, given the state interest in
maintaining border integrity, searches of the person did not have to comply
with the strict standards laid down in Hunter v. Southam. However, the
Court also observed that departures from the Hunter v. Southam standards
“will be exceedingly rare”.62
In the years following Hunter v. Southam63 and Simmons,64 the
Supreme Court has been very reluctant to depart from the Hunter
standards, at least where the privacy interest is high and the police are
pursuing a criminal investigation. Indeed, the court has only generally
been prepared to find warrantless searches reasonable, where the police
were acting pursuant to some lawful authority in compelling and urgent
circumstances. Thus, in R. v. Grant, the Court decided that a warrantless
search for drugs under section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act65 was
reasonable, but only if there was an “imminent danger of the loss, removal,
destruction or disappearance of the evidence sought in a narcotics
investigation”.66 In R. v. Godoy,67 the warrantless entry and search of an
apartment in response to a “911” call was held reasonable, given the
compelling public interest in preserving life and health.68 In the context
of searches of the person conducted pursuant to the long-standing
common law power of search as an incident of arrest, the Court held, in
R. v. Golden,69 that strip searches in the “field” will only be reasonable
“where there is a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for
weapons or objects that could be used to threaten the safety of the
accused, the arresting officers or other individuals”.70
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R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296, at 319 (S.C.C.).
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[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1.
66
R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 173, at 189 (S.C.C.).
67
[1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
68
See R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.). In Godoy, the police
power to conduct the search was grounded in the Waterfield test (R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R.
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that the impugned conduct amounted to a justifiable use of police powers associated with that duty.
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[2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 159 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
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However, it seems that, even in the context of criminal investigations,
departures from the Hunter v. Southam71 standards may be justified if
the reasonable expectation of privacy is low and the intrusion is minimal.72
And, where the state interest is not the pursuit of a criminal investigation,
but rather the investigation of regulatory offences, the Court has been
more willing to relax the Hunter v. Southam standards. At least that
seemed to be the case until the decision of R. v. Jarvis,73 which has, in
my view, added some uncertainty to what seemed a relatively well-settled
area of the law.
In a developed and complex society, where many activities are
necessarily regulated in the broader public interest, governments obviously
need some means of ensuring that individuals are actually complying
with the regulatory obligations imposed upon them. Many regulations
would be rendered ineffective if government had no power to conduct
random inspections or compel the production of books and records that
one might be required to maintain. The Supreme Court has, therefore,
recognized that some types of search and seizure in the regulatory
sphere will not be subject to the Hunter v. Southam74 standards. The
rationale for this is two-fold: individuals typically hold a lower expectation
of privacy in respect of regulated activities; and the regulatory standards
would be practically unenforceable if investigators were required to
demonstrate the existence of reasonable and probable grounds as a precondition to engaging their powers of search and seizure. In Thomson
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission),75 La Forest J. stated:
. . . the degree of privacy the citizen can reasonably expect may vary
significantly depending upon the activity that brings him or her into
contact with the state. In a modern industrial society, it is generally
accepted that many activities in which individuals can engage must
nevertheless to a greater or lesser extent be regulated by the state to
ensure that the individual’s pursuit of his or her self-interest is compatible
with the community’s interest in the realization of collective goals and
aspirations. In many cases, this regulation must necessarily involve the
71

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
See, for example, R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.), where
Cory J. stated that, given the reduced expectation of privacy in respect of vehicle movements, prior
judicial authorization for a vehicle tracking device, which is minimally intrusive, could be granted
on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).
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inspection of private premises or documents by agents of the state. The
restaurateur’s compliance with public health regulations, the employer’s
compliance with employment standards and safety legislation, and the
developer’s or homeowner’s compliance with building codes or zoning
regulations, can only be tested by inspection, and perhaps unannounced
inspection, of their premises. Similarly, compliance with minimum wage,
employment equity and human rights legislation can often only be
assessed by inspection of the employer’s files and records.76

Thomson Newspapers77 was concerned with whether the compelled
production of documents in the context of an investigation into possible
offences under anti-combines legislation violated section 8 of the Charter.
The decision can be somewhat difficult to follow because each of the
five members of the panel provided reasons. However, the decision was
released at the same time as the Court’s decision in R. v. McKinlay
Transport Ltd.,78 a case involving compelled production of information
and documents under the Income Tax Act.79 Reading both cases together,
it is clear that a majority was of the view that compelled production of
documents is a seizure under section 8, and that, while the individual’s
expectation of privacy may be high in relation to “criminal” investigations,
it will be less so in the regulatory or administrative sphere. A majority
of the Court also acknowledged that intrusions into expectations of
privacy will be reasonable in the regulatory sphere, if they are necessary
to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework and not too intrusive.
In essence, the Court in each case balanced the state interest in
enforcement of the regulatory scheme against the degree of expectation
of privacy held in the circumstances. Given the relatively low expectation
of privacy, the state interest in enforcement prevailed.
What was critical to the outcome in each case was the characterization
of the nature of the investigative provisions at issue. In McKinlay
Transport,80 all were agreed that the Income Tax Act81 and the powers of
compulsion were regulatory in nature, and it was impracticable to insist
on compliance with the Hunter v. Southam82 standards. Tax officials
76

Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at 476 (S.C.C.).
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would be unable to effectively investigate and audit taxpayers if they
were required to have reasonable and probable grounds. In Thomson
Newspapers,83 the minority was of the view that the provisions in question
were “criminal” or “quasi-criminal”, and therefore subject to the Hunter
v. Southam standards. Justice La Forest, however, rejected this position,
pointing out that offences are often included in regulatory schemes to
promote compliance; that is, they are introduced for instrumental reasons.
For La Forest J., there was a fundamental distinction between regulatory
offences and “true crimes”; it was only where the latter arose that the
individual enjoyed a heightened expectation of privacy warranting
application of the Hunter v. Southam standards. As he explained:
To recapitulate, the relevance of the regulatory character of the
offences defined in the Act is that conviction for their violation does
not really entail, and is not intended to entail, the kind of moral reprimand
and stigma that undoubtedly accompanies conviction for the traditional
“real” or “true” crimes. It follows that investigation for purposes of the
Act does not cast the kind of suspicion that can affect one’s standing
in the community and that, as was explained above, entitles the citizen
to a relatively high degree of respect for his or her privacy on the part
of investigating authorities. This does not, of course, mean that those
subject to investigation under the Act have no, or no significant,
expectation of privacy in respect of such investigations. The decision
of this court in Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, makes clear that they
do. But it does suggest that the degree of privacy that can reasonably
be expected within the investigative scope of the Act is akin to that
which can be expected by those subject to other administrative and
regulatory legislation, rather than to that which can legitimately be
expected by those subject to police investigation for what I have called
“real” or “true” crimes.84

So, Thomson Newspapers85 and McKinlay Transport86 seemed to
stand for the general proposition that regulatory or administrative searches
and seizures would typically be found reasonable, even if warrantless,
so long as the power in question was necessary to ensure and promote
compliance with the regulatory scheme in question and was not overly
83
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).
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Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at 483 (S.C.C.).
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invasive. The jurisprudence, thereafter, was generally consistent with
this approach. Inspections of business premises in a regulated industry,
although characterized as “searches” under section 8, were upheld as
reasonable, given that they were necessary to investigate complaints and
ensure compliance.87 Powers compelling individuals to appear before
investigators inquiring into possible infractions of securities regulations,
to testify under oath and produce documents and records, were found
reasonable given the low expectation of privacy in business records held
by those who chose to enter highly regulated industries.88 And in Del
Zotto v. Canada,89 the Supreme Court agreed with Strayer J.A. in the
Federal Court of Appeal90 that an inquiry power under the Income Tax
Act,91 permitting compelled testimony from witnesses and compelled
productions of documents, was not unreasonable, even if the inquiry
was convened in contemplation of a potential prosecution. In coming to
this conclusion, Strayer J.A. emphasized the regulatory nature of the
Income Tax Act,92 the fact that conduct such as tax evasion is made an
offence under the Act for strictly instrumental reasons, the minor level of
intrusion and the reduced expectation of privacy. Justice Strayer stated:
There cannot be the exaggerated claims to privacy connected with
the administration of the Income Tax Act which the appellants assert.
The Act requires all manner of disclosure. The taxpayer must, for
example, disclose: his place of residence; his age; his social insurance
number; his marital status or whether he is living common law; his
sources and amounts of income; his dependants, their ages and possible
physical conditions if handicapped; the amounts and objects of his
charitable or political donations, if he is to claim tax credits; whom he
employs and entertains if he seeks to deduct the costs as business
expenses; and details of his pension arrangements. If he is employed
he must disclose many of these details not only to Revenue Canada but
also to his employer so that mandatory tax deductions can be made.
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Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Potash; Comité paritaire de l’industrie
de la chemise v. Sélection Milton, [1994] S.C.J. No. 7, 91 C.C.C. (3d) 315 (S.C.C.).
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A subpoena duces tecum is not a major intrusion of privacy as
compared to a search.93

The Supreme Court, however, also made it clear in the years after
Thomson Newspapers94 and McKinlay Transport95 that the determination
whether a given regulatory search is reasonable is ultimately a balancing
exercise. Where the individual’s expectation of privacy is low, the state
interest in enforcing compliance with regulatory standards will ordinarily
prevail. But where the expectation of privacy is high, the Court will be
more inclined to insist on strict compliance with the Hunter v. Southam96
standards. Thus, in Baron v. Canada,97 per Sopinka J., the Court decided
that a search of private premises to gather evidence for the prosecution
of a taxpayer under the Income Tax Act98 did not justify a departure from
the Hunter v. Southam standards.99 This makes sense. Although the
taxpayer may only have a relatively low expectation of privacy in records
and documents themselves as against the Canada Revenue Agency,
there are obviously other significant privacy interests engaged when tax
investigators enter private premises, and it is appropriate for the authorities
to obtain a warrant in order to intrude upon these latter interests.
Justice Sopinka did, however, make one curious statement in the
course of deciding Baron.100 He suggested that the purpose of the search,
the gathering of evidence for a tax prosecution, was a relevant factor in
holding the tax investigators to the Hunter v. Southam101 standards. This
is confusing and seems incorrect. McKinlay Transport102 had affirmatively
decided that the Income Tax Act103 was regulatory legislation, and, as
La Forest J. noted, tax offences were created for “instrumental” reasons.
The expectation of privacy in relation to the books and records that one
is expected to maintain under the Income Tax Act104 is low. It cannot be
the case that the taxpayer’s expectation of privacy varies depending on
93
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the purpose for which those records are sought by tax officials. The
expectation of privacy remains the same, whether the basis for the
investigation is random spot monitoring, or information from a disgruntled
ex-spouse which gives rise to grounds to believe that the taxpayer has
been running personal expenses through his company for years. As long
as the search remains within the “investigative scope” of the Income Tax
Act, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in books and records.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé added a further twist in Comité paritaire,105
when she suggested in obiter that an inspection power under a regulatory
scheme can be used to enter premises only up to the point that investigators
have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has
been committed.106 Thereafter, the investigators must presumably resort
to warrants to enter premises and search for evidence. This strikes me as
a strange result, and perhaps only justified on the basis that since the
investigators have reasonable and probable grounds, they may as well apply
for warrants in any event. But one might ask what is accomplished by
imposing a requirement of judicial authorization in such circumstances,
for an application for prior judicial authorization serves little purpose if
the legislator has already provided investigators with inspection powers.
A simple example will suffice to make the point. Suppose investigators
think that they have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a
regulatory offence has been committed and apply for a warrant. In such
circumstances, the state interest in enforcing the regulatory scheme
would ordinarily result in the issuance of a warrant permitting them
entry. Yet, if the justice should find that the investigators do not have
sufficient reasonable and probable grounds, then the investigators can
resort to their powers of inspection and enter the premises. In each case,
the investigators can enter the premises and intrude upon what is a
relatively minimal expectation of privacy. The Hunter v. Southam107
standards serve no practical purpose, if investigators can resort to a power
permitting warrantless entry in the absence of reasonable grounds. I see
no reason why investigators should have to suspend powers of inspection,
simply because they may have reasonable and probable grounds to believe
an offence was committed.
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Jarvis108 has added to the confusion, for although the case itself
ultimately turns on a question of statutory construction concerning the
ambit of certain powers under the Income Tax Act,109 some language
used by the Court may suggest that, even in the regulatory sphere,
investigators have to surrender audit or inspection powers if they are
intent on gathering evidence for prosecution purposes.
Tax officials have fairly broad inquiry powers under the Income Tax
Act.110 Under section 231.1, they can, for any purpose related to the
administration or enforcement of the Act, enter without warrant any
premises, except a dwelling house, to inspect, audit or examine the
books and records of the taxpayer, as well as any other document that
may be relevant to the determination of the amount owing by the
taxpayer. Under section 231.2, the Minister of Revenue may, again for
any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act,
require that any person provide information or documents. And, under
section 231.3, a warrant may be obtained, if there are reasonable grounds
to believe that an offence under the Act has been committed, to enter
and search any place for evidence pertaining to the offence.
Jarvis111 was concerned with whether the powers under sections
231.1 and 231.2 could be used to further a prosecutorial investigation
without infringing Charter rights. Admittedly, the case is complicated
somewhat by the fact that the accused challenged the provisions at issue
under both section 7 and section 8 of the Charter, and much of the
decision could be said to turn on the extent to which the protections
against self-incrimination under section 7 were triggered as a result of
certain utterances and productions that were compelled under sections
231.1 and 231.2. However, the Court made some observations that
would seem directly applicable to the assessment of the reasonableness
of the search under section 8.
The Court in Jarvis112 ultimately concluded that the broad powers of
inquiry could not be used to build a prosecution case against an accused,
even though the Income Tax Act113 was a regulatory statute and the
taxpayer’s expectation of privacy in the type of records and documents
sought by tax officials is low. It is important to understand how the
108
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Court reached this conclusion. The Court’s interpretation of Parliament’s
intent is, in my view, the determinative factor in the case. The Court’s
reasoning was that, since Parliament made it possible for the Minister to
obtain warrants to investigate offences where reasonable and probable
grounds exist, then Parliament must have intended that the warrantless
powers be restricted in their use:
The existence of a prior authorization procedure where the commission
of an offence is suspected creates a strong inference that the separate
statutory inspection and requirement powers are unavailable to further
a prosecutorial investigation.114

The Court was also of the view that there had to be some separation
between the audit and investigative functions because the individual’s
liberty interest is at stake during an investigation:
Although the taxpayer and the CCRA are in opposing positions
during an audit, when the CCRA exercises its investigative function
they are in a more traditional adversarial relationship because of the
liberty interest that is at stake. In these reasons, we refer to the latter as
the adversarial relationship. It follows that there must be some measure
of separation between the audit and investigative functions within the
CCRA.115

Curiously, although the Court appeared to have found that Parliament
must have intended that warrants be obtained once reasonable and probable
grounds existed to believe that an offence under the Act had been
committed, the Court did not follow L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s obiter comments
in Comité paritaire 116 and require that tax officials actually obtain a
warrant at that stage. Rather, the Court said that tax officials only had to
relinquish their inspection and requirement powers once their inquiry
engaged the “adversarial relationship” between the taxpayer and the
state, that is, once the predominant purpose of a given inquiry became
the determination of penal liability.117 The Court reasoned that requiring
that auditors obtain warrants whenever reasonable and probable grounds
exist would be too problematic:
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Even where reasonable grounds to suspect an offence exist, it will not
always be true that the predominant purpose of an inquiry is the
determination of penal liability. In this regard, courts must guard
against creating procedural shackles on regulatory officials; it would
be undesirable to “force the regulatory hand” by removing the possibility
of seeking the lesser administrative penalties on every occasion in which
reasonable grounds existed of more culpable conduct. 118

Now, if Jarvis119 is seen simply as a matter of statutory construction,
I have no great difficulty with the result, even if I think that the
reasoning given in support of the interpretation of Parliament’s intent is
rather strained and results-driven. If sections 231.1 and 231.2 must be
restricted as a matter of statutory interpretation to audits, then use of
those powers in furtherance of prosecutorial investigations oversteps the
bounds of what the statute permits. Use of the powers in such
circumstances, therefore, is not authorized as a matter of law, and
amounts to an illegal search.
The real question, though, is whether Jarvis120 represents something
more than this, and whether the statements made by the Court have
application beyond the case itself. Is it the case that whenever there is a
prior authorization procedure available, that no resort can be made to
other investigative powers of search or seizure if the adversarial relationship
has been engaged? Moreover, does Jarvis stand for the principle that the
Hunter v. Southam121 standards will apply whenever the liberty interest
of the subject is engaged in the course of a regulatory investigation, that
is, whenever investigators shift their focus to the determination of penal
liability? And if that is the case, how does one reconcile that with the
results in Thomson Newspapers122 and Del Zotto,123 where the very purpose
of each inquiry was to determine whether offences had been committed?
Jarvis124 raises many questions. All we can say for certain at the
present time is that, even in the regulatory context, investigators will
need to be very cautious before using warrantless powers of search and
seizure to build a case for prosecution purposes.
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V. SHOULD THE PRIVACY CLAIM BE VALIDATED BY
EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE?
Of course, for every person accused of a crime, there is little comfort
in successfully alleging a violation of the right to privacy, if it does not
result in the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.
The decision whether to exclude evidence arising from a section 8
violation is simplified, in that the court will typically not need to consider
the first step of the well-known Collins125 analysis, whether the breach
implicates the fairness of the trial. This follows from the fact that the
seizure of real, non-conscriptive evidence is typically the result of a section
8 violation, and such evidence does not affect the fairness of the trial.
Decisions whether to exclude evidence obtained as a consequence
of a violation of the right to privacy turn on the second and third steps of
the Collins126 analysis, the seriousness of the breach and the effect that
exclusion would have on the repute of the administration of justice.
Again, this really calls for the court to engage in yet another balancing
exercise, weighing the infringement of the privacy interest against the
state interest in effective law enforcement.
At the second step of the Collins127 inquiry, one assesses the seriousness
of the breach by considering factors such as the level of intrusiveness,
the degree of expectation of privacy that was held by the accused, the
good faith of the police, and whether reasonable and probable grounds
existed in any event.128 One then goes on, at the third step of the Collins
inquiry, to consider whether vindication of the Charter right will extract
“too great a toll” on the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial.129
In many instances, and particularly those where the evidence is
probative of a serious offence, the administration of justice should
ordinarily favour admission of the evidence, rather than exclusion. We
recognize that privacy rights can be subordinated to the state interest in
law enforcement. That is why privacy can be overridden to gather
evidence of crimes. And I think that this is so because privacy rights are
not the only means by which we promote dignity, integrity and autonomy.
Conduct is usually criminalized because it causes harm to others, and
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offends their rights to dignity, integrity and autonomy. The prosecution
of offences, in a very real sense, validates the rights of those who were
victimized by the accused. The individual who has committed an offence
should not evade criminal liability for his acts, by being permitted to
shield himself behind the rights he has himself invaded. So, the state
interest in law enforcement should ordinarily prevail in the face of a claim
of privacy infringement, unless the conduct of the state is so egregious
that admission of the impugned evidence will actually bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
The conduct of the police, as recognized by Doherty J.A. in
Kitaitchik,130 will often then be determinative of the result. If the police
acted in “good faith”, in the sense that they believed they were acting
pursuant to some grant of lawful authority, the evidence will ordinarily
be admitted. If the police acted in “bad faith”, in the sense that they
deliberately infringed the accused’s rights, the evidence will often be
excluded because of the effect that judicial condonation of the violation
would have on the administration of justice.131
What is problematic, however, is when the courts start examining
police conduct and find an absence of good faith when there was no
deliberate violation of the accused’s privacy interests. The Supreme
Court in R. v. Mann132 stated that good faith cannot be claimed if the
Charter violation was committed on the basis of a police officer’s
unreasonable error or ignorance as to the scope of his or her authority.133
Yet this assumes that the legal rules propounded by the courts provide
sufficient certainty and predictability, which is far from being true.
Navigating the complexities of Charter jurisprudence is often a challenging
task, and it can be exceedingly difficult for the police to determine
whether a given course of action is Charter-compliant. This is particularly
so when the police are required to make rapid decisions in fluid and
highly charged environments, far removed from the calm detachment of
a courtroom.
The current approach to the assessment of “good faith”, however,
leads to curious rulings to the effect that the police unreasonably interpreted
the scope of their authority, when appellate judges cannot even agree
among themselves whether the police conduct amounted to a Charter
130
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violation in the circumstances. So, in R. v. Buhay,134 the police were
ultimately found to have acted unreasonably, yet three members of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal did not even think that the accused had
established a reasonable expectation of privacy. In R. v. Law,135 the
officer’s conduct was said to be “serious”, although two members of
the New Brunswick Court of Appeal thought there was no Charter
violation. And in the recent decision of R. v. Harris,136 the police officer
was said to have displayed an unreasonable ignorance as to the scope of
his authority, even though one member of the panel, in dissent, thought
that the actions of the police officer complied with the Charter. If highly
capable jurists can find themselves in disagreement on whether certain
police conduct amounts to a Charter violation, it seems unfair to
characterize the police actions as “unreasonable” and to hold the police
to a standard of perfection which appellate judges cannot even achieve.
We would do well in future to abandon the concept of “good faith”,
and simply ask whether a violation of a Charter right was deliberate or
wilful, since those are the types of violations that truly offend the rule of
law and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. Honest
mistakes as to the scope of lawful authority, even if they might be said
to be unreasonable, do not warrant exclusion of the evidence, since they
do not reflect a lack of regard for the individual’s constitutional rights.
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